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THE SOUND OF SILENCE:
THE CONTINUING LEGAL
DEBATE OVER CLASS ACTION
RESCISSION UNDER TILA
Jo Carrillo' and Paul Kofoed**
I. THE SOUND OF SILENCE
This paper analyzes federal law on the issue of whether
consumers of mortgage products can sue as a class to rescind a
mortgage loan under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA").'
Embedded in this question are deeper economic issues about the cost
and availability of credit in the United States, and about who should
bear the risk of faulty mortgage disclosures.2 The TILA governs
these matters as an existing statutory scheme that provides pre-
bankruptcy and pre-default remedies to consumers of credit.3
In 1994, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal certified a rescission
class action in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage, a case involving fees of $223
dollars per loan.4  Congress res onded to Rodash by enacting a
moratorium on class action cases. The moratorium was eventually
lifted on October 1, 1995, but during the moratorium period,
Congress set out to respond to the so-called Rodash problem.' The
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. SSRN: * Professor
of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author-30289
**B.A. Harvard University; J.D. University of California Hastings College of the Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2005) is silent on this point.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(f) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(h) (2005).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005) (providing for statutory rescission defined as tender of loan
principal, return of fees and interest, and cancellation of security interests).
4. Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
5. Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1380, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
6. 141 CONG. REC. S 14567 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995)(statement of Senator D'Amato) ("H.R.
2399 is intended to curtail the devastating liability that threatens our housing finance system in the
wake of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Rodash versus AIB Mortgage Co.);
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ensuing debates led to a set of 1995 amendments to TILA.
The post-Rodash 1995 Amendments (Amendments) raised
TILA's tolerance bar from $10 to $100.' The Amendments also
barred class action rescission cases in which the lead plaintiff alleged
errors below TILA's $100 low-tolerance limit. Claims that alleged
errors above TILA's tolerance bar-what are herein called no- or
alternately above-tolerance rescission claims-were not discussed
explicitly in the Amendments, but neither were they barred.! Indeed
federal courts continued to certify rescission class actions well past
1995 and into 2007.9
The TILA gives homeowners a right to rescind mortgage loans."
A homeowner has three business days after the later of
consummation of the transaction," delivery of notice of the right to
rescind, and delivery of all Truth in Lending Disclosures ("TILDs")
to rescind, meaning that when all three of these events occur, TILA's
so-called cooling off period goes into effect.12 The homeowner also
has a continued right of rescission for cause-this right can be
invoked when a lender's mandatory TILDs are improper, inaccurate,
or absent. 3 Thus the rescission right can be belated for up to three-
years, even after consummation, if the consumer can show that the
lender failed to meet its notice or disclosure obligations under
(statement of Senator Sarbanes) ( H.R. 2399 is "a solution to the so called Rodash problem.... in
which "small violations of the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act triggered the right of
rescission provided by that act.").
7. 141 CONG. REC. S14567-08 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes
discussing the difference in legal treatment under the 1995 TILA Amendments between low tolerance
rescission claims and what are herein called "above tolerance rescission claims," meaning rescission
claims that are brought for lapses improper disclosure resulting in errors over $100. TILA 1995
Amendments raised the TILA tolerance bar from $10 to $100. Nevertheless, the legislative history
makes clear that while the House raised the tolerance limit above $100, the final Senate legislation
lowered it back to $100 on the ground that "a low tolerance is needed to ensure that consumers are
receiving accurate information about the cost of credit.").
8. See also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)(holding that FED. R. Civ.P.23(b)(2)
allows federal statutory claims to be brought as class actions unless directly and expressly banned by
Congress).
9. See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2005).
11. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §. 226.2(a)(13) (2008) (defining "consummation" as "the time that a
consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction"). Neither TILA nor Reg. Z. define
when the contractual obligation comes into existence, leaving the issue to state law.
12. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.2(a)(6) (2008).
13. See, e.g., Exercising the Right of Rescission, TRUTH IN LENDING, 640, 648 (2000) (discussing,
for example, that if an closed-end transaction is consummated on a Friday, June 1 and notice of the
right to rescind plus all material disclosures are also given on that date, then the right to rescind expires
on midnight of the following Tuesday, June 5. But if a creditor makes a mistake in providing notice of
the right to rescind or a mistake in a material disclosure, then the right to rescind does not end three
business days after consummation, but rather the right to rescind continues to exist despite
consummation and even though the parties have moved forward on the transaction).
2 Vol. 6:1
THE SOUND OF SILENCE
TILA.14
Section 1635(b) of the TILA explicitly addresses the mechanical
process by which rescission is to take place, at least during the three-
day rescission period. It provides that when a homeowner sends a
notice to rescind, the lender has twenty calendar days after receipt of
the consumer's rescission notice to return any money to the consumer
and to terminate the security interest." Regulation Z adds that when
a consumer rescinds, the security interest is rendered void and the
consumer is no longer liable on the transaction."
In the case where consummation, notice of rescission, and
material disclosures all fall on the same day, rescission is a relatively
mechanical process, since it occurs during the three-day cooling off
period." But in a belated rescission case, the process of rescission is
considerably less mechanical and thus, by comparison, far more
uncertain than it would have been had it occurred during the cooling
off period."
Therein lies one key question raised by the current debate over
class action rescission claims. If the consumer invokes his or TILA
right to rescind in a belated rescission case, how should the rescission
process move forward? Should the rescission process protect the
consumer, as it would if it were exercised during the three-day cooling
off period when restoring the parties to the status quo ante is still a
straightforward matter? Or is there an "equitable" consideration that
might recalibrate the TILA process more toward protecting the
lender's interests?" In a belated rescission case, should the courts
steer their procedural holdings by the concept of consumer rights or
creditors' rights?20
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005) (extending the rescission period to 3 years for cause); Beach v.
Ocwen, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 243 F.R.D. 313, 315 (E.D.
Wis. 2007) ("The provision extending the period of rescission is a statute of repose rather than a statute
of limitations.").
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005) (detailing the rescission process); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2)
(2008) (Upon rescission, the creditor must "return any money or property that has been given to anyone
in connection with the transaction."); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(1) (2008) (certain security interests
must be refunded to the consumer).
16. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d), 226.23(d) (2008). Commentary §§ 226.15(d)(3)-2,
226.23(d)(3)-2 (2008).
17. See, e.g., EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION:, TRUTH IN LENDING 645-647 (2000).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION: TRUTH IN LENDING 651 (2000) (citing Cox
v. First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 633 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ohio 1986)).
20. See, e.g. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 243 F.R.D. at 615-16 (discussing the sunmary
judgment standard); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1007-1009 (E.D. Wis.
2007) (granting defendant's stay and discussing likelihood of success on appeal). Cf Jefferson. v.
Security Pacific Financial Services, 161 F.R.D. 63, 68-69 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (framing the dispute as one of
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TILA and Regulation Z provide that the security interest is
voided when the consumer rescinds.21 The creditor has a twenty-day
period after receipt of the consumer's notice to rescind to return any
money to the consumer and to begin the process of terminating the
security interest (though it be void).22 The question of how a belated
rescission process might work is a question on the merits. Still, it has
steered the courts as a shadow concern on the question of whether to
certify a rescission class. Obviously concerns on the merits get
amplified in class actions.23
Questions about the relationship between class certification and
rescission were addressed in TILA's 1995 post-Rodash legislative
history.24 In that history, Congress concluded that during the three
day-rescission period, Section 1635(b) envisions a self-executing
deterrent whereby the lender is to release its security interest before
the consumer tenders the loan principal." If the security interest is
voided before the consumer repays the borrowed funds, then the
mortgage lender becomes an unsecured creditor26-this evidently is
TILA's built-in deterrent against lender disregard for the disclosure
process-at least in the three-day cooling off period. If however
TILA rescission is conditioned on tender, as lenders today argue that
it should be, then the lender wins a protection vis-a-vis the consumer
that the literal language of 1635(b) does not grant.27
creditors' rights under section 1635(b)).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (2008).
22. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2) (2008).
23. See, e.g., Evans dissent in Andrews, 545 F.3d 570, 578-80 (7th Cir. 2008).
24. 141 CONG. REC. S14567 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005).
26. H.R. REP NO. 104-93 at 52 (1995) (statement of Rep. Roukema)("When a mortgage is
rescinded, the borrower is released from the mortgage lien leaving the lender with an unsecured loan,
and the borrower is entitled to repayment of interest and all other payments made on the loan.").
27. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that despite language of TILA
regarding rescission sequence, courts could condition cancellation of security interest on tender);
Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a court can
impose conditions on the voiding of a creditor's security interest); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329
F.3d 1167, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Am. Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that unconditional rescission is inappropriate where borrowers cannot first
repay loan principal); Ruiz v. R&G Fin. Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (D.P.R. 2005) (holding
rescission is conditional upon tender of loan principal).
See Griffith L. Garwood, Truth-in-Lending After Two Years, 89 BANKING L.J. 3, 8 (1972)
(Garwood was an advisor to the Legal Division of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System); Truth in Lending, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227, 1234-1242 (1974) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for
judicially altering TILA section 1635 language); Notes: Truth in Lending - Right of Rescission, 1975
Wis. L. REV. 192, 197-202 (1975) (discussing and comparing the options for managing the debtor's
obligation under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) as read in relation to Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.
1974)); Richard P. Goddard, Judicial Erosion of the Rescission Right under Truth In Lending, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979 (1978) (discussing judicial interpretation of section 1635); Consumer
Protection: Judicial Approaches to Rescission and Restoration Under Truth in Lending Act, 53 WASH.
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Of late, lenders have argued against a hard-line rule that
obligates them to go first in the rescission process.' Ironically, they
have also argued against conditional rescission, which would allow
them to go second in that same process. 29 The span of these opposing
legal arguments is over-inclusive-it covers both poles of Section
1635(b). Moreover, it taps into a powerful cultural vein, one in which
liability is a stand-in for factors that lenders argue are out of their
control-factors like improvident consumer spending,o the (mis)use of
rescission to palliate economic woes caused by consumer
overspending, judicial disregard for the realities of mortgage
lending, 32 and, ultimately, the current volatility of the nation's
33
economy.
Important to the current debate is the historical debate that
occurred in 1995 over the post-Rodash TILA Amendments. 4 In the
L. REV. 301 (1978); Elwin Griffith, Lenders and Consumers Continue the Search for Truth in Lending
Under the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 611, 651 (2007)(discussing
recent cases at footnote 237).
28. See, e.g., McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corporation, 475 F.3d 418, 422 (1st Cir.
2006) (noting that the mechanics of rescission are uncomplicated in any given individual case and that a
creditor can seek "equitable modifications," presumably such as requiring tender before a security
interest is canceled).
29. Id. at 424. (acknowledging the economic problem for lenders if wholesale rescission were to
occur).
30. See, e.g., ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 16-20, 33-38, 292-293 (2000) (criticizing what he calls the "normative
individualistic perspective" at 292-293 and citing GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING AMERICA: A CRITIQUE
OF THE GLOBAL CREDIT CARD SOCIETY 71-72 (1995) for promoting the normative individualistic
argument that,"People are not helpless victims .. . Before they can take steps to deal with credit card
abuse, people must accept the fact that their credit card is a personal trouble."); See generally, DANIEL
HOROWITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICA,
1875-1940 78 (1985), and LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999) (each discussing historical appearances of this normative view
of consumer spending).
31. This has been a recurrent theme in the national media. See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Distressed
homeowners fight foreclosure by taking their lenders to court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2009 at (Business);
Lew Sichelman, Document review could save home, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2008 at (Chicago Homes) 8;
Ilyce Glink, Sometimes, Loans Should Be Unlocked, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2009, at F04; A better
bailout, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008 at A18; Gretchen Morgenson, The Silence of the Lenders, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2008 BU 1; Tom Bayles, Fallout from CCI deals continues, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB.,
July 28, 2008 at D12.
32. See, e.g., Ruth Simon, Ruling Faults Lender in Option ARM Suit, WALL. ST. J. (E. ED.), Jan.
18, 2007, at D6 (quoting Chevy Chase General Counsel,Thomas McCormick, as saying that Chevy
Chase plans to appeal and that "[t]his is a very technical and complicated area, and I simply believe the
judge came to some legal conclusions that are not correct.").
33. Robert D. Manning, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S ADDICTION
TO CREDIT 16 (2000) (making the point generally and citing Lendol Calder, FINANCING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 299-301 (1999) for the same point from the
historical record).
34. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *29-32, Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 129 S. Ct. 2864
(2009) (No. 08-1206).
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1995 amendment debates, the meaning of rescission was clear.
Rescission was a right created by TILA (not by the agreement of the
parties) according to which the lender was to return money to the
consumer and cancel the security interest before the consumer
tendered the mortgage principal." Congress intended for this process
to leave the lender in an unsecured position. Today, lenders are
recycling Congressional arguments from 1995 that were made in
relation to fifty class action low tolerance lawsuits filed after Rodash
was decided.36 The strategy has been effective in barring consumers
from courts, but it skirts around the fact that today's class action
rescission lawsuits clearly fall above (not below) the adjusted TILA
tolerance level that was set in 1995.
This strategy has also forced the federal circuits (and courts in
states that have been hard hit by the mortgage crisis) to address the
question of whether consumers have the right under TILA Section
1635 to bring above-tolerance rescission claims in class form. The
issue could divide the federal circuits.
Our goal in this article is to offer a straightforward analysis of
the recent decisional law on class action rescission claims. To that
end, Part Two introduces the competing legal rationales for denying
or supporting class action rescission under Section 1635. Part Three
examines the rationale that would bar class action claims for
rescission-the framework that the First Circuit Court of Appeal
adopted in McKenna. Part Four examines the rival rationale that
would allow class action claims for rescission-the rationale that the
United States District Court for the Seventh Circuit adopted in
Andrews. Part Five analyzes decisional law that the McKenna Court
of Appeal and the Andrews District Court cases relied on. Finally,
Part Six concludes that the courts should allow class action rescission
claims for legal, economic, and social policy reasons.
35. 141 CONG. REC. S14566-03 (1995).
36. 141 CONG.REc. Sl4566-03 (1995).
37. See cases cited infra note 38.
38. For: McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2006);
Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 621-22; Latham v. Residential Loan Ctrs. of Am., No. 03-C-7094, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7993, at *8-12 (N.D. Ill. 2004)(criticizing Jefferson v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161
F.R.D. 63 (N.D. Ill. 1995)); Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co., 226 F.R.D. 147, 153 (D. Mass. 2005);
Mcintosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust, Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (D. Mass. 2003); Williams v.
Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 435-36 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Against: McKenna, 475 F.3d at 425; Andrews, 545 F.3d 570; LaLiberte v. Pacific Mercantile Bank, 147
Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 (2007); Murry v. America's Mortg. Banc, Inc., No. 03-C-5811, 2005 US Dist.
LEXIS 11751, at *30-31 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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II. FIXING THE RODASH PROBLEM: WHAT ABOVE-
TOLERANCE CLASS ACTION RESCISSION IS AND ISN'T
To determine whether TILA permits above tolerance class
action rescission claims, federal courts interpret 15 U.S.C. Section
1635,TILA's rescission provision." On its face 15 U.S.C. Section 1635
is silent on any and every question surrounding class actions claims.
But, in the context of its post-Rodash legislative history, Section 1635
appears to implicitly permit class action rescission claims. By
contrast, 15 U.S.C. Section 1640, the TILA provision governing
money damages, allows class actions cases since it caps class action
damages for a single violation at the lesser of $500,000 or one percent
of the creditor's net worth."4 Section 1635 has no analogous cap on
liability other than the 1995 post-Rodash amendments that limit
rescission to new money borrowed.4' This makes a Section 1635 class
action rescission claim a potentially broader remedy than a TILA
Section 1640 claim for statutory damages.42
As far back as 1995, lender reports to Congress claimed that the
cost of rescinding all refinanced mortgages over a three-year period
could be as high as $217 billion.43  At that time, Congress spoke
directly to the lender liability issue. Legislative history notes that fifty
class action rescission cases were filed after Rodash. In response to
those cases Congress passed a time sensitive moratorium on class
action claims under TILA." As to the fifty class action cases,
Congress discussed the relationship between minor errors in
disclosure and massive potential liability. Congress concluded that
39. 15 U.S. C. § 1635 (2005).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2005).
41. Id. See Rohner, supra note 13, at 617-667. See also 141 CONG. REc. S14566-03 (1995),
(statement of Sen. Mack) ("Moreover, as is currently set forth in the Federal Reserve regulations, when
a borrower refinances an existing loan and takes out new money, only the new money is subject to
rescission.").
42. Rescission under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2005) is potentially more powerful than its common
law equivalent because it is a matter of consumer right, not of judicial equity. See, e.g., 141 CONG.
REC. H9513-01 (1995), (statement of Rep.Gonzales) ("The right of rescission is an extraordinary right
that TILA provides for consumers to safeguard their homes."); R. Clontz, Jr., Truth-in-Lending: Judicial
Modfication of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227, 1229-1234 (1974) (discussing the
differences between rescission under the common law and under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) as originally
enacted).
43. H.R. REP. No. 104-193, at 52 (1995) (comments of Rep. Roukema)("The potential cost of
rescinding all refinanced mortgages made in the last 3 years - the time allowed under the Truth in
Lending Act to exercise the rescission right - has been estimated to be as high as $217 billion."); 141
CONG. REC. S5614-02 (comments of Sen. D'Amato)("The potential for massive rescissions, based on
technical disclosures errors of as little as $10, creates a potential for liability that has been estimated to
be as high as $217 billion.").
44. Truth In Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1380, 104th Cong. (1995).
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the way to deal with the problem of size of error relative to liability
was to raise the tolerance bar, which meant that only those cases
among the fifty that did not meet the raised tolerance bar could no
longer go forward on the merits-whether in class or individual form.
In other words, Congress was not concerned just with bare
liability. Rather it had a more nuanced concern over how technical
disclosure errors of small amounts relate as a matter of law to
estimates of potentially high lender liability. To address that concern
over this relationship, Congress raised the TILA tolerance level from
$10 to $100. In doing so Congress barred low-tolerance cases in
whatever form--whether individual or class-but left unaffected
rescission class action claims in above-tolerance cases where the
lender error rose above the new $100 level.45 Additionally, the 1995
amendment debates contain passages that demonstrate concern with
preventing foreclosure.46 In sum, the entirety of the 1995 amendment
debates clarified Congress's intent to allow above tolerance claims in
whatever form-whether individual or class. The Federal Reserve
thought so as well; as to the class action claims that fell above the
tolerance level, the 1995 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve
concluded, "those lawsuits will now proceed under the new law,
which limits the lenders' liability."
Today, similar concerns about lender liability get voiced.
Looking at individual cases, lenders offer estimates of liability to
courts as part of their advocacy efforts; they do so in the law review
literature as well.48 In Andrews, the lender's estimate of liability was
$210 million.49 In McKenna, the lender's estimate was $200 million."o
In the California Court of Appeal case of LaLiberte, the lender's
45. 82nd ANN. REP. OF THE FED. RESERVE, 227 (providing "[a] number of class action lawsuits
filed subsequent to Rodash alleged violations for the failure to disclose certain fees as financial charges
and sought the remedy of rescission for thousands of loans. Many of these lawsuits were put on hold in
May 1995, when the Congress enacted a temporary moratorium on such litigation. The moratorium
expired October 1, 1995, and has now been replaced by the TILA amendments. Those lawsuits will
now proceed under the new law, which limits the lenders' liability.").
46. 141 CONG. REC. S14566-03 (1995)(statement of Rep. Gonzalez) ("I want to emphasize that
this bill is a compromise. It is not a perfect product, but it does address a legitimate concern of the
mortgage banking industry about the Truth in Lending Act. In crafting this legislation, pains were
taken to ensure that important consumer safeguards were not dismantled. The right of rescission is an
extraordinary right that TILA provides for consumers to safeguard their homes. I am pleased that this
right was largely preserved and that the consumer will be able to rescind loans where the lender has
made an egregious error or in particular circumstances against foreclosure.")
47. 82nd ANN. REP. OF THE FED. RESERVE at 227.
48. Angela C. Zambrano and Kent Barnett, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Should a Court
Certify a Class of Residential Consumers Seeking a Declaration that the Consumers - If They Later
Choose - Are Entitled to Rescind for a TILA Violation, 125 BANKING L.J. 160, 174 (2008).
49. Andrews, v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008).
50. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 424.
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estimate of its potential liability was $37 million." These numbers are
indeed daunting, but missing from the lenders' appeals are the
counterbalances that Congress concerned itself most with in the 1995
post-Rodash amendment debates. In 1995, Congress was concerned
with the relationship between small errors and large estimates of
potential liability. In 2007, lenders are recycling the 1995 debates as
the basis for requesting that courts forget about the size of the error
alleged and concern themselves only with large estimates of potential
lender liability.
It is important to point out that TILA rescission is corrective
right created by statute, not by the contract. In light of this, recent
liability estimates, by contrast, incorrectly imply that TILA rescission
is contractual. Put in context, these estimates lose their relevance, as
discussed earlier, insofar as they fail to explicitly acknowledge that (1)
rescission is a statutory remedy created by Congress, not a penalty
allowed by the agreement of the parties, and (2) when Congress
discussed rescission class action liability it was in relation to the size
of the triggering error. In 1995, Congress was concerned that small
errors would trigger class action rescission;52 Congress was not
concerned only with class action rescission." Congress considered
rescission as the return of the parties to the status quo ante, meaning
as a right "more akin to a unilateral right to cancel, than to rescission
in the traditional equity sense."m It was Congress's view then and it
remains the law today that consumers retain a statutory right of
rescission in the appropriate circumstances; in some cases that right of
rescission will be exercised in the three-day cooling off period, in
other cases that right will be exercised belatedly.
That said: rescission is a statutory right that obligates both
consumer and lender. Rescission is a return of the contracting parties
to the position they would have been in had they never entered into
the contract." The fact that the arithmetic involves daunting numbers
does not and should not change the nature of what rescission means
51. LaLiberte v. Pacific Mercantile Bank, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 (2007).
52. 141 CONG. REC. S 14566-03 (1995).
53. Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act, H.R. 1380, 104th Cong. (1995) (Congress was
concerned with class action in the moratorium legislation, but that moratorium was lifted on October 1,
1995). See also 82nd ANN. REP. OF THE FED. RESERVE, 227 (providing "[a] number of class action
lawsuits filed subsequent to Rodash alleged violations for the failure to disclose certain fees as financial
charges and sought the remedy of rescission for thousands of loans. Many of these lawsuits were put on
hold in May 1995, when the Congress enacted a temporary moratorium on such litigation. The
moratorium expired October 1, 1995, and has now been replaced by the TILA amendments. Those
lawsuits will now proceed under the new law, which limits the lenders' liability.").
54. RALPH J. RoHNER & FREDERICK H. MILLER, Truth in Lending, 2000 A.B.A. Sec. Bus. Law.,
595, 598.
55. Id.
Winter 2010 9
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as a legal matter;1 it simply means that the borrower tenders the loan
principal in full, and in exchange the lender returns to the buyer any
fees and interest paid on the ill-gotten loan contract. True, rescission
is a deterrent against the accumulation of profits gained at the
exense of federal disclosure law, but rescission is not a penalty per
se.
The main statutory issue with TILA's rescission provision is that
Section 1635 does not explicitly allow rescission class actions. But
neither does it explicitly prohibit them. Instead, Section 1635
explicitly grants consumers a right of rescission under subsection (a),
explicitly speaks to the order in which TILA rescission is to proceed
in subsection (b), but is silent on whether class action rescission
claims-direct or declaratory-are permitted. There are competing
theories for how best to interpret this textual gap.
Moreover, there is the question of what the gap in Section 1635
means or should mean as a social policy matter." Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its interpretation is of course
implicated too." Lenders want courts to hold that 1635 is restrictive.
They want to keep their profits to above-tolerance loans (assuming
the plaintiffs' disclosure allegations are established), and they want to
simultaneously hold the consumer to the risk of default for these
same products.60 TILA does not create such a wide anything-goes
field of play for lenders.
56. See The Right of Rescission Under Truth in Lending, TRUTH IN LENDING 595, 599 (2000)
("When consumers exercise the right in precisely the manner envisioned by Congress, the result
probably accords with the law dictionary definition of 'rescission of contract.' But with the unique
requirements of the TIL Act, and in the hands of courts that exercise broad remedial powers, the truth in
lending (TIL) rescission rules sometimes produce strange results, occasionally amounting to a forfeiture
that puts one party far ahead of the status quo.").
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Andrews, 545 F.3d at 578-79 (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)(F.R.C.P. 23 allows class action claims
unless directly and expressly banned by Congress). Congress has banned class actions. See, e.g., Soc.
Sec. Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(d)(5). 98 Stat. 1794, 1798 ("No
class in a class action relating to medical improvement nay be certified . . ."); Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) ("no covered class action based upon the statutory
or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained by any State or Federal court by
any private party alleging (1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connnection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.").
60. See generally, Mark Zandi, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
IMPLOSION, AND How TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009)(Chief Economist and Cofounder
of Moody'sEconomy.com rating agency linking together disparate threads of housing/credit crisis to
discuss how the effects of the fallout are felt by consumer and investor); Robert J. Shiller, THE
SUBPRIME SoLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT (2008)(explaining the origins of the subprime lending crisis and how the effects fall on the
consumer).
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Indeed if TILA is to retain any semblance of being a consumer
protection statute, then the rationales that restrict class action
rescission must be scrutinized. Excusing lenders from federal truth in
lending disclosure requirements because of a fear of lender liability is
far less tolerable to society and markets than rescission class actions
would be. Rescission class actions can potentially rein in unbridled
lending practices-and indeed some members of Congress have said
as much." They can also provide consumers with an affordable way
to assert their rights. And, class actions can shield the courts from
being overburdened by thousands of plaintiffs-all with identical
computer-generated TILDs-who must seek rescission on an
individual basis simply because lenders have succeeded in barring
rescission in class form.'
If Congress wants to restrict class action rescission cases it has
two options. It can ban class action rescission cases outright,
something Congress did not do in 1995. Or, it can raise the TILA
tolerance bar from $100 to a higher number, a solution the House
considered but that the Senate later rejected.63 Both of these options,
if selected in the future, would favor lenders, not consumers.
Only Congress, not the courts, can do away with rescission in its
class form, just as only Congress, and not the courts, can raise the
61. Truth in Lending Act Amendments, 141 CONG. REC. H9513-01 (1995) (Remarks of Rep.
Gonzalez) ("I am also heartened that consumers will retain the so-called cooling-off period . . . [w]ith
this right, consumers can walk away from a bad deal within 3 days).
62. Truth in Lending Act Amendments, 141 CONG. REC. H9513-01 (1995 )(Remarks of Rep.
McCollum) ("The bill does a number of important things [including removing the threat] to mortgage
backed securities markets, caused by the ambiguity surrounding the proper treatment of certain charges,
and the extremely low tolerance for any error in making disclosures.").
See also, Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act (1995), 141 CONG. REc. S5614-02
(Remarks of Sen. Mack) ("I do not believe that the authors of the Truth in Lending Act intended to
stifle creative lending and punish the mortgage industry for technical violations of its complex
disclosure provisions. If the courts were to permit borrowers to rescind loans [for technicalities] as part
of class action lawsuits, the impact could be felt from the financial institutions and the secondary
markets all the way to the Federal deposit insurance funds, which are ultimately backed by the U.S.
taxpayer.").
63. Truth in Lending Act Amendments, 141 CONG. REC. H9513-01 (1995) (Remarks of Rep.
McCollum)
"[R]ecognizing the highly technical nature of the Truth in Lending Act, the bill raises the
tolerance level for understated disclosures, going forward, from $10 to $100 for civil
liability purposes. Regarding the tolerance related to the award of statutory damages
under section 130 of the act, the finance charge will be considered accurate on a
prospective basis if the disclosed amount is within $100 of the actual amount; the
accuracy tolerance for civil liability on [a) past transaction is set at $200. Overstatements
continue to be allowed without imposing liability. For errors which can lead to rescission
of the loan, which is a much more extreme penalty, the tolerance is one-half of 1 percent
of the loan amount. However, for certain refinance loans where the refinancing borrower
did not receive additional new advances from the creditor .. . tolerance is I percent of the
loan amount."
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tolerance bar and thus make TILA claims harder for consumers to
bring. As a parallel matter, if Congress decides to deprive the
American consumer of the right of rescission in class form, then
Congress should explain itself. "[A] company which wrongfully
exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap a
handsome profit; the class action is often the only way effective way
to halt and redress such exploitation."" That used to be the U.S.
Supreme Court's view, and apparently it was Congress's view when it
set the TILA bar first at $10 and later at $100. The consumer can
only hope that this view still holds.
The recent cases discussed in this article stem from an
unprecedented diversification of product in the mortgage industry.
This diversification led to brisk business for lenders in a low interest
rate/boom housing market." Today, however, as markets
demonstrate that they can twist precipitously downward, lenders
implore the federal courts to err on the side of caveat emptor in
lending rescission cases despite the fact that TILA rights are created
by federal law, not by the parties' agreement.
Until Congress clarifies the silence in Section 1635, the courts
have the unenviable front guard job of deciding where to place the
burden of liability given the existing TILA regime." Are lenders
accountable as a matter of law for the widespread harms that could
follow in the wake of mortgage products whose costs were not
accurately disclosed?67 TILA would say yes, under certain conditions.
Can the loans that those lenders consummated be rescinded if
material terms were not properly disclosed to consumers? Again,
TILA would say yes. Can consumers sue as a class for the right to
rescind loans that are covered by TILA? This is the unanswered
question before the courts today. It is a question that should be
answered in the affirmative, since a yes answer is consistent with
TILA's language, legislative history, and consumer protection
purpose. Finally, it is a question that ideally should be answered by
64. Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 446 (2000).
65. Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Responses to Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 5
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing changes in mortgage lending in current housing boom).
66. ZANDI, supra note 60, at 5 (observing that "federal regulatory structures had difficulty
responding" because "after regulators finally began to speak up about subprime and the other types of
mortgage loans that had spun out of control, such lending was already on its way to extinction. What
regulators had to say was all but irrelevant.").
67. See, e.g., Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2007)
(citing Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 344 (10th Cir. 1973) and quoting
same to say that "the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that TILA prohibited class actions, concluding
that 'there is nothing on the Act itself, the Rule [Rule 23] or the notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to it which expressly or impliedly precludes class actions of this
type of case."').
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Congress.
TILA represents the best private remedy in existence for (still
solvent) consumers at this time. On its face TILA is silent on the
class action issue. But TILA's 1995 legislative history is replete with
discussion and debate over class action rescission in low-tolerance
cases. Indeed TILA's material term language turns on the low-
tolerance/above-tolerance distinction. Additionally, as the rescission
right must be raised by the consumer in a timely manner or else lost,
policy dictates that courts interpret TILA to allow consumers to
preserve their TILA rescission remedy. TILA rescission is one of the
only viable private remedies that consumers can invoke at this
nascent stage of a massive foreclosure crisis. In our opinion, it would
be wise, at least until Congress has clearly said otherwise, to keep
consumer options open rather than to prematurely close them.
Two frameworks typify the split in the federal courts over class
action rescission claims under Section 1635. McKenna, a First Circuit
Court of Appeals case, reverses the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts to hold that Section 1635's silence bars
rescission class action cases.6s Andrews, a U.S. District Court case
arising in the Eastern District of Wisconsin but just recently reversed
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, preserves consumer rights
to rescission class actions under TILA also by citing to Section 1635's
silence.69  Both decisional frameworks discussed herein make clear
that there is a world of meaning in the sound of 1635's silence; but
Congress's post-Rodash Amendment debates suggest that there is but
one correct way to interpret that silence.
III. THE RATIONALE AGAINST CLASS ACTION
RESCISSION CLAIMS
The First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in McKenna was
decided before the U.S. District Court for the Seventh Circuit handed
68. McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 291,308 (D. Mass.
2006)(granting class certification for purposes of TILA rescission); McKenna, 475 F.3d at 420
(opinion handed down on Jan. 29, 2007 decertifying rescission class).
69. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 16, 2007 (granting class
certification for purposes of TILA rescission); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 474 F. Supp. 2d
1006 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (granting a stay on Feb. 5, 2007, and issuing its opinion on Feb. 14, 2007
denying defendant's summary judgment motion on rescission class action issue); Andrews, 545 F.3d at
573 (reversing denial of the summary judgment motion on rescission class action issue); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009) (No. 08-1206); Andrews v.
Chevy Chase Bank, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (June 29, 2009) (cert. denied).
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down its 2007 decision in Andrews.70 A comparison of the competing
frameworks in McKenna and Andrews demonstrates the difference
between their interpretations. These two frameworks agree in their
application of the 1995 post-Rodash Amendments to TILA. They
agree that there is a line between low-tolerance and above-tolerance
cases. But they differ in their view of why Congress disallowed class
action rescission in low-tolerance cases in the first place.
In the current foreclosure crisis, the rationale against declaratory
class action rescission claims in mortgage origination cases was first
stated in McKenna." In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the
lender failed to disclose accurate information during the origination
71phase about the plaintiff's right to rescission.72 Plaintiffs filed a
federal court claim to rescind their mortgage loans; shortly thereafter
they filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking class
certification. U.S. District Court Judge Reginald C. Lindsay (now
deceased) referred the class certification issue to Magistrate Judge
Judith Gail Dein. Magistrate Judge Dein recommended certification
of the class by a "declaration that any class member who so desires
may seek to rescind their transaction."
Defendants challenged the recommendation: they argued that
general statutory construction principles required Judge Lindsay to
conclude that Congress acted with a single intention when it limited
class action lawsuits in TILA Section 1640 (damages) in 1974 but
then-in the same amendment process-kept silent about the class
action issue as it relates to Section 1635 (rescission)." Defendants
took the view that the 1640 limitation on class action damages claims
carried over to any 1635 class related rescission claims. Defendants
ignored the function of time in their analysis in the sense that the
defendants failed to explain why 1974 amendments, and not 1995
post-Rodash amendments, ought to decide a 2007 TILA case. 76
Judge Lindsay ruled against the defendants' motion to decertify
the class. Judge Lindsay also conceptualized the relief as a
"declaratory judgment" so that "any class member who so desires
70. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
71. Id. at 294 (D. Mass. 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 295.
76. See generally, Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994); Truth in Lending
Act Amendments, 141 CoNG. REC. S 14566-03 (1995).
77. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
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may seek their transaction."78 Defendants appealed.79
According to plaintiff-consumers, the defendant-lender
inaccurately disclosed rescission related information on the TILDs,
and in so doing violated TILA and the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Law as to approximately 8,900 consumers. " This laid the
basis for a Rule 23 case." On appeal, the McKenna defendant
attacked the idea that Rule 23, TILA Section 1635, and
Massachusetts' consumer protection law intersect." The loans
involved in McKenna were option ARM loans, but the TILA basis of
the lawsuit turned on whether the lender had adequately explained
statutory (Section 1635) rescission rights in its standard disclosures."
The defendant-lender urged the court to decertify the class out of
concern for massive liability-a theme recycled from the 1995 post-
Rodash TILA Amendment debate.
TILA serves the nearly impossible purpose of providing the
Davids of the residential mortgage world with the information they
need to prudently negotiate with the Goliaths of that world. Plus,
TILA goes a step further to deter providers of credit from misleading
consumers of credit, a link that is of importance to proper
securitization." TILA does this by giving consumers of credit the
substantive right of rescission in strict liability form: If a lender fails to
meet its disclosure obligations, then the consumer can invoke TILA
remedies.
In light of this background, the McKenna defendants argued that
the federal court should decertify the class and thus require that each
78. Id.
79. McKenna, 475 F.3d 418.
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140D, § I (LexisNexis 2007).
81. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 420-421 ("With respect to the putative class, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that any class member who elected to do so could rescind his or her credit transaction with
First Horizon at any time during the extended three-year statutory default period.").
82. Id. at 420 ("What makes [this action] unusual is that, in addition to their claims for
individualized relief, the plaintiffs asserted that First Horizon's practices had victimized countless
others.") Plaintiffs' allegation tracks Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (1lth Cir. 1994), but
it enhances it with the additional allegation that the defendant failed to respond to plaintiffs' rescission
requests.
83. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 420. ("This interlocutory appeal requires us to explore, for the first time,
the crossroads at which class-action rules intersect with the rescission provisions of the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA).")
84. Id. ("Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that First Horizon had inaccurately disclosed
information pertaining to consumers' statutory rescission rights and, subsequently, had failed to respond
appropriately to requests for the rescission of residential refinancings." In the plaintiffs' view, these
violations of the TILA and the MCCCDA entitled them to rescission of their loans and statutory
damages.")
85. Jo Carrillo, This Little Loan Went to Market: The Consumer-Lender-Investor Equation of
Federal Truth in Lending, 28 BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY REPORT 7 (2009).
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one of the 8,900 class members approach the court on an individual
basis. The rationale for this solution was only the potential for
massive estimated liability should a class of 8,900 consumers be
allowed to seek rescission on identical documents; it was not an
assessment of the size of the triggering error in relation to the
estimates of liability.
Judge Reginald C. Lindsay had, at the district court level,
rejected this recycled liability argument. Instead he correctly read
TILA to protect consumers and to further the interests of judicial
efficiency. The First Circuit Court of Appeal opinion in McKenna,
however, took the opposite view. It even went so far as to suggest
that rescission class action lawsuits are filed by greedy plaintiffs
lawyers-a theme that got a fair amount of play in the 1995 post-
Rodash TILA amendments-or alternatively by wishful consumers
who did not read their contract documents-a theme new to the
debate as of this most recent housing crisis.
Loaded language illustrates the First Circuit's misunderstanding
of how TILA protects consumers, but so too do more subtle markers.
For example, the McKenna court of appeal opinion states it is "nose-
on-the-face plain that unrestricted class action availability for
rescission claims would open the door to vast recoveries," and that
plaintiffs' attempts to read the statute otherwise is "wishful
thinking."" The McKenna rationale also confuses damages with
rescission, arguing that rescission is a personal remedy that should be
available only on an individual, case-by-case basis." Additionally, it
regards consumer protection and economic stabilization as competing
rather than as cooperative policies.
In terms of media-capturable images, the McKenna rationale
implies that mortgage default is a problem caused by consumers, not
by lenders. Specifically, the McKenna rationale supports the view
that mortgage default is the result of individuals who acted in bad
faith - consumers who presumably reached beyond their fiscal means,
or who failed to read their mortgage contract, or who overstated (lied
about) their income for the purpose of getting a mortgage loan.
Because the McKenna rationale frames the dispute in this way, it
necessarily simplifies the problem of errors in mortgage disclosure b
creating a disabling certitude-a place where analysis cannot occur.
86. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 424-25 ("It is nose-on-the-face plain that unrestricted class action
availability for rescission claims would open the door for vast recoveries," and, at 424, "This is wishful
thinking.") (cited in Zambrano and Barnett, supra note 48, at 165 as a clear "effect on the banking
industry.").
87. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 425.
88. Jo Carrillo, Disabling Certitudes: An Introduction to the Role of Mythologies of Conquest in
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From this troubling point it is but a short step to the incorrect
(authors' view) conclusion that federal law can be set aside by judges
in order to shield lenders from the mathematics involved in returning
fees and interest that were gained in violation of federal disclosure
law.
It bears repeating that TILA rescission is not a penalty. Rather
it returns the parties to the position they would have been in had the
loan not been consummated: The borrower tenders the loan principal
in exchange for a return of fees and interest paid." This is TILA
rescission. This is one remedy-the other being damages-that
Congress contemplated for violations of TILA. If truth in lending
remedies and rules are diminished, it should be by the pen of
Congress, not piecemeal by the federal courts.
In sum, the First Circuit Court of Appeal decision in McKenna
turns on a skeptical question: Won't TILA "open the door for vast
recoveries?" That question leads to another: how specifically is it that
returning loan principal to lenders on a class basis might result in
further "financial disaster in the mortgage industry?"' And why are
the courts concerned with the lending industry at the expense of
consumers, investors, or their own interests in efficiency?
Astonishingly the First Circuit Court of Appeal framed the
problem in McKenna as one caused by consumers who attempt to
cancel the loans of lenders who made "honest mistakes?" 9' This is
astonishing because it appropriates the concerns of the 1995 post-
Rodash amendments for low-tolerance claims to the above-tolerance
claims of today. In 1995 Congress was concerned that class action
rescission would harm lenders who made technical errors that were of
no financial consequence to either party. Could an $11 lender error
lead to rescission? Prior to the 1995 Amendments the answer was
(theoretically) yes, but after 1995, Congress wisely closed that door by
raising the bar to $100, not by denying the remedy of rescission in
whatever form.
When Congress closed the door to low-tolerance rescission cases
in individual and class action form, it did not close the door to
Law, 12 FLA. J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 13 (2000).
89. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 424 (Proposing that in response to Rodash, Congress amended TILA
"to provide higher tolerance for what it viewed as honest mistakes in carrying out disclosure
obligations" and thus "in taking this step, Congress made manifest that although it had designed the
TILA to protect consumers, it had not intended that lenders would be made to face overwhelming
liability for relatively minor violations.").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 424 (noting that TILA amendments are meant to signal "higher tolerance levels" for
"honest mistakes" on the part of mortgage lenders).
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rescission in individual or class form for above tolerance errors.
Moreover, when Congress closed the rescission door on low-tolerance
errors it did not do so with the intent of excusing lenders from TILA
compliance. It was never Congress's intent to create a shield behind
which lenders could distribute identical computer-generated TILDs
that contained material above-tolerance errors in disclosure.
TILA has never been optional for lenders. TILA is not optional
now. But the First Circuit Court of Appeal's rationale in McKenna
has the practical effect of making TILA disclosures optional insofar
as it limits rescission to consumers on a case-by-case basis. After the
McKenna decision, TILA becomes a hit or miss law, reminding us of
the old joke about schools issuing pencils without erasers since
students no longer make mistakes.
On its facts, McKenna is an important case; it is the first federal
circuit court of appeal case to rule against class action rescission in 27
years. It is also the first federal circuit court of appeal to rule against
class action rescission in the context of the worst foreclosure crisis on
record.92 But the McKenna rationale is unpersuasive insofar as it
gives great weight to lender estimates of liability without linking those
estimates to the egregiousness of the disclosure error. What the
opinion fails to observe is that when Congress raised concerns in 1995
about excessive rescission liability, those concerns were about
excessive (aggregate) liability in relation to low-tolerance mistakes
that-unaddressed-would have had no financial consequence to the
consumer. Without empirical data it is difficult to tell whether the
failure to disclose rescission rights in McKenna was a lender mistake
of financial consequence to any one consumer. Certainly the failure
to disclose would most likely inure to the benefit of the lender, not to
the consumer, and not to the investor, whose securitized position was
made even riskier as the law blocked consumer efforts to address the
dangers caused by the complex mortgage products that they had
obtained in up-market days.
IV. THE RATIONALE IN FAVOR OF CLASS ACTION
RESCISSION CLAIMS
The Seventh Circuit was briefed and heard oral arguments on
September 26, 2007, on the appeal of the TILA class rescission
certification in Andrews. On September 24, 2008, the Seventh Circuit
92. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 425. The only other federal circuit court to deny TILA rescission class
certification was James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, Inc., 621 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Court of Appeal handed down its decision to decertify the consumer
class. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision
exacerbates the problem identified in this paper, namely: what does
Section 1635's facial silence on the issue of class action rescission
mean for home owners who are facing mortgage default?
Going back in time to the year 2007, the U.S. District Court in
Andrews allowed declaratory class action rescission in an opinion that
explicitly rejected the First Circuit Court of Appeal's rationale in
McKenna." In Andrews, the alleged TILA violation went to the core
of TILA's protections. Andrews, was a challenge to the lender's
Annual Percentage Rate ("APR") cost disclosures of its option ARM
product. The central allegation in Andrews went to the core of the
current mortgage crisis as well because in Andrews, the plaintiffs
alleged that at origination the lender disclosed the option ARM as a
fixed (payment) low cost mortgage when in fact the loan was an
adjustable (and thus potentially high cost) product.
The lender's disclosure called its option ARM product a "WS
Cashflow 5-year fixed."94 The "note interest rate" was listed as
1.950%."9' The number of payments was listed at 60, at the minimum
payment of $701.21, or alternatively at 300 payments at the minimum
payment of $983.49.96 The APR was defined as "the cost of your
credit as a yearly rate, which is subject to change," and it was listed at
4.047% per month for five years.
Plaintiffs stated that they took the option ARM product because
they "believed that the payments and the interest rate on the WS
Cashflow 5-year fixed were fixed for five years at the lowest stated
interest rate of 1.950% and became variable thereafter."" In point of
fact, this 1.950% rate was a teaser rate that applied only to the first
monthly payment, after that the initial and variable 4.047% applied,
but it too was subject to change, meaning it was adjustable. Indeed,
there was nothing fixed about the WS Cashflow 5-year fixed product
despite the TILD's suggestion otherwise. For that reason the TILD
raised the legal issue: did the TILD clearly convey to the ordinary
consumer that the WS Cashflow 5-year fixed product was an
adjustable rate mortgage with a one-month discount rate? 9
93. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009-1010 (2007) (criticizing the McKenna rationale).
94. Exhibit A, Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement, discussed at length in Andrews, 240 F.R.D.
612, 616-620 (2007).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 615.
99. Exhibit A, Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement, supra note 94.
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As it happened, the Andrews' minimum fixed payment of
$701.21 became insufficient to cover the interest accruing on the loan;
the loan went into negative amortization." This in turn led to an
increase in the actual APR of the product. The Andrews' five-year
option ARM loan was scheduled to reset in its fifth year to a new rate
that reflected the loan's principal balance at that point. But as early
as May 2007, only three years into the repayment period, the loan hit
its 110% negative amortization cap."o At that point, the minimum
payment on the Andrews' loan got slated to climb from $701.21 to
$1,628.32 at a new 8.25% interest rate-an increase in monthly
payments of $927 on a loan that was negatively amortizing for a total
package that was at an APR higher enough than the original APR to
have warranted a new disclosure.'02 The Andrews' mortgage was
secured by the family's home.103
In a 2007 class action claim for rescission the Andrews alleged
that Defendant Chevy Chase failed to disclose the true cost and
variable nature of its option ARM product." The class included
7,000 borrowers with WS Cashflow 5-year fixed mortgages, all
originated by Chevy Chase Bank and all with material terms disclosed
to the consumer with the same, as in with the identical, computer-
generated TILD.'os
Under TILA, the standard for testing the clarity of a TILD
disclosure is the ordinary consumer standard, with the question being
whether an ordinary consumer would find the disclosures reasonably
understandable.'" The ordinary consumer standard is a strict
objective standard; compliance depends upon the contents of the
disclosure form, not upon how the form affects any individual
(empirical) reader.' Therefore, mandated disclosures only meet
current federal TILA standards if those disclosures convey accurate
and clear information about the loan under the ordinary consumer
100. Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(2) (LEXIS through 2007 legislation).
Cf GENE D. SULLIVAN AND R. MARK ROGERS, The Adjustable Mortgage Loan: Benefits to the
Consumer and to the Housing Industry in HOUSING AND THE NEW FINANCIAL MARKETS (Richard L.
Florida ed.) 380-81 (1986) (noting that negative amortization represents risk to the lender in the form of
making an unanticipated loan).
101. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 615.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 616 (failure to disclose variable nature of loan's payment schedule); Id. at 617 (failure to
disclose payment period); Id. at 617-20 (conflicting information on discount interest rate versus annual
percentage rate); Id. at 619-21 (failure to disclose variable interest rate feature of the loan); Id. at 620
(insufficient disclosure on negative amortization).
105. Id at 620.
106. Id. at 616.
107. Smith v. Check-N-Go, Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999).
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standard. The ordinary consumer standard scrutinizes TILDs from
"the standpoint of an ordinary consumer, not the perspective of a
Federal Reserve Board member, federal judge or English
professor. ""8
Moreover under TILA, a disclosure is clear if it is subject to no
more than one interpretation. A disclosure is unclear-and thus in
violation of TILA's mandatory disclosure provision-if it is subject to
more than one interpretation from the standpoint of an ordinary
consumer." Litigation that results in improved disclosures down the
line is an important part of how TILA is designed to promote market
stability over time." The idea is that lenders will use Federal Reserve
Forms and/or amend their forms in response to actual consumer
complaints, the net result being that forms will in fact get clearer - for
the consumer-with each amendment process.
On January 16, 2007, Judge Lynn Adelman of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied defendant's
summaryudgment motion and instead allowed the class certification
to stand.'' Defendant Chevy Chase Bank immediately challenged
the ruling, citing McKennall2 for the proposition that TILA Section
1635 precludes class action rescission cases.1
In a separate opinion handed down on February 14, 2007, Judge
Adelman granted Chevy Chase Bank's motion for a stay pending
appeal, but concluded that the bank should not prevail on appeal
based on McKenna."4 Judge Adelman explicitly rejected the holding
and the reasoning of the First Circuit in McKenna, noting that while
Congress amended 15 U.S.C. Section 1640 in 1974 to set a damages
cap, Congress did not make a comparable reference to class actions
when it amended 15 U.S.C. Section 1635, meaning that "[i]t is just as
likely that Congress did not intend to limit rescission claims in any
way."" No discussion was had of the 1995 post-Rodash amendments.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal took an interlocutory
appeal on the class rescission issue. Judge Sykes wrote the Court of
Appeal opinion. She concluded that 1635's silence on "the class form
108. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 616 (citing Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., 195 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir.
1999)).
109. Id.
110. McKenna, 475 F. 3d at 426.
111. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 621. (citing Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co., Inc., 226 F.R.D.
147, 153 (D. Mass. 2005), and quoting Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 436
(E.D.Pa. 1998)).
112. McKenna, 475 F.3dat 425.
113. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
114. Id. at 1010.
115. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 621.
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of action" and the "fundamental incompatibility between the
statutory-rescission remedy and the class form of action" barred
consumers from joining together to seek declaratory action."'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal had many
troubling points. It assumed that the lead plaintiffs were experienced
mortgage borrowers: thus Judge Sykes reasoned that the consumer,
not the lender, should be scrutinized when discrepancies in a
mortgage's disclosed costs come to light since the consumer was
experienced."' Second, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's
reversal conflated common law rescission and TILA rescission."
Common law rescission is an equitable remedy; TILA rescission is a
statutory remedy granted by Congress to the consumer.11 Equitable
rescission is allowed when a loan is voidable; TILA rescission is
allowed if the lender fails to meet its duties of disclosure. TILA
rescission is triggered not by the loan's voidability, but by the lender's
failure to meet a standard of disclosure set by Congress.
In light of the foundational weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeal reversal, U.S. District Court Judge Lynn Adelman's
opinion in Andrews and U.S. District Court Judge Reginald C.
Lindsay's opinion in McKenna remain important for how they assess
the problem of class action rescission in cases alleging substandard
mortgage disclosures.
Moreover, in terms of its understanding of the policy concerns at
hand Judge Adelman's U.S. District Court opinion is superior to
Judge Sykes' Court of Appeals opinion. Judge Adelman wrote, for
example, that the class certification was valid because the Andrews
case involved "public wrongs and widespread injuries." 20 Judge
Adelman wrote that public policy ultimately dictated his decision to
certify a class whose claims arose from infirmities in the same in the
loan TIL documents.121 Indeed, in Judge Adelman's analysis, the
disregard of TILA's mandates would "reward defendants who may
have committed wrongs and leave victims who may have been
wronged uncompensated."'22
116. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 571.
117. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 574.
118. Id.
119. See Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1lth Cir. 1992) ("The
sequence of rescission and tender set forth in § 1635(b) is a reordering of common law rules governing
rescission.").
120. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 621.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("Denial of class action status would reward defendants who may have committed wrongs
and leave victims who may have been wronged uncompensated." Citing Note, Class Actions Under the
Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1416, 1435 (1974).)
22 Vol. 6:1
THE SOUND OF SILENCE
Judge Sykes Court of Appeal opinion, by sharp contrast, was not
informed by the current context in which these cases are and will
continue to arise.m Judge Sykes wrongly blamed the plaintiff (not the
lender) for failing to detect the loan disclosure problems because the
plaintiff "runs his own home-remodeling business, and.. . [has]
previously taken out many original and refinancing mortgage loans
for various residential and investment properties." Indeed, she went
against TILA's ordinary consumer mandate to recast the Andrews
and their thousands of class members,ordinary people, as actors on
par in the mortgage lending industry with Chevy Chase Bank and
thus as actors who should have detected the problems of Chevy
Chase Bank's misleading disclosures.
Judge Sykes opinion gives the Andrews-our consumer
everyman and everywoman-the burden of repeat-player-status
without the benefit of economies of scale. In so doing Judge Sykes
excused the true repeat player, Chevy Chase Bank, from complying
with TILA. TILA, with its ordinary consumer disclosure standard,
disallows or should disallow this sort of blame-the-consumer bias on
the part of federal judges, who-as Judge Evans' dissent in Andrews
argues-are interpreting a silence in a consumer protection statute in
the absence of clear direction from Congress itself.2 4 "If Congress
intended to preclude rescission class actions," wrote Judge Evans, "it
should amend the statute and correct the error itself. When a court
cleans up Congress's mess, it only encourages poor drafting. And if
the court gets it wrong-a hazard of judicial guesswork-then all
suffer."125
Due to the weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit court of appeal
opinion, it is the earlier U.S. District Court opinion in Andrews that
hews closer to the public record on TILA, a record that is comprised
of the statute, the post-Rodash amendment debates, and the
decisional law discussed herein. Therefore the lower court opinion
must continue to serve as guidance for plaintiffs and courts in other
jurisdictions, where class action rescission has not yet been
addressed.m Andrews raises the social policy issue of whether courts
123. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 573 (basing its decision on McKenna, 473 F. 3d at 427; James, 621 F.
2d 727, 731 (5th Cir. 1980) and LaLiberte v. Pac. Mercantile Bank, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007). See also Jo Carrillo, Irregularities in Mortgage Disclosures: Classwide Rescission Under the
Truth in Lending Act, 25 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 3 (2007) (discussing LaLiberte v. Pac. Mercantile Bank,
53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
124. Andrews, 545 F. 3d at 578-79.
125. Id.
126. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95-160 (1974) (hypothesizing about the importance of repeat player
status in determining courtroom victories); see also Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflections on
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have the power in the words of Judge Adelman "to shield lenders
from liability in ways that Congress has not."27 And it is this issue
that should animate the outcome in those states that are facing
widespread fallout from massive mortgage foreclosures.
On a social policy level, the question becomes where to place the
blame for faulty mortgage disclosures. The McKenna court of appeal
rationale focuses on the excessive liability estimates of the lender to
support its idea that consumer class action rescission claims will harm
the economy.128 The Andrews district court opinion, on the other
hand, implied-correctly in our view-that the mortgage crisis was a
function of systemic factors. Judge Adelman refused to blame the
consumer in light of TILA's consumer protection purpose. Instead
he took the view that the courts' refusal to certify a class would
punish the victims of TILA violations while rewarding unscrupulous
lenders for their unlawful practices.129 Judge Evans, in his dissent in
the Andrews court of appeal, ratified the lower court view taken by
Judge Adelman.'
The trial court in Andrews and the Seventh Circuit dissent in
Andrews come full circle to assert that any deviation from TILA's
exacting standard of clarity is a violation of TILA; and any violation
of TILA gives the consumer the right to invoke the statutory rights of
rescission.'' This consumer-friendly rationale downplays concerns
about aggregated liability from class actions on the lending industry,
particularly as Defendant repeated the aggregate liability arguments
from the 1995 post-Rodash TILA amendment debates. Instead, the
Andrews district court rationale focuses on the benefits to consumers
and to the legal system of permitting class action rescission suits in
cases that exceed TILA's post-Rodash tolerance level.132
In conclusion, the McKenna First Circuit Court of Appeals'
rationale articulates a rule to protect lenders. By contrast, the
Andrews U.S. District Court rationale articulates a rule that is
consistent with the consumer protection purpose set out by Congress
in its TILA legislation. For that reason alone, the two opinions are
rival responses to the current mortgage crisis. Both cases ask whether
declaratory rescission in its class form is a private remedy that can be
available to consumers now when they most need rescission to
Galanter's Haves Article and Work It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & Soc'y REv. 1099 (1999).
127. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
128. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 425.
129. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 n.I
130. Andrews, 545 F. 3d. at 578-579.
131. Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 615-16.
132. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 n.1.
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prevent foreclosure. Both cases opine on TILA's consumer
protection purpose. Both cases are cognizant of the fact that
important policy issues of where to place blame for faulty disclosures
are at stake. Yet, the McKenna court of appeals rationale (now
buttressed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in
Andrews) collapses into a normative individualistic analysis that
blames the consumer, whereas the Andrews district court rationale
(now buttressed by the seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's dissent in
Andrews) holds firm to idea that TILA disclosure mandates are the
law of the land in above-tolerance cases notwithstanding the systemic
events that have taken place to roil real estate markets, credit
markets, and investment markets.
V. OTHER COURTS PERMITTING CLASS ACTION
RESCISSION
A number of other courts have certified rescission classes only to
be reversed on appeal. On April 23, 2007 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois issued two rulings in a consolidated
group of consumer class actions against Ameriquest and its affiliates.'33
In Ameriquest, the court distinguished between a class action that
seeks to rescind loans and a class action that seeks a declaratory
judgment that loans are rescindable to hold that a class can be
certified for declaratory judgment purposes.134 The court thought that
class certification might be inappropriate in a direct rescission case,
but it held that since declaratory rescission only affirms the class
members' right to initiate rescission claims on an individual basis
within the three-year for-cause repose period declaratory class action
rescission could be workable. This theme did not get discussed in the
1995 post-Rodash amendment debates in Congress.
Among federal district courts of the Seventh Circuit, the trend
had been towards certifying declaratory rescission in class form. This
trend was abruptly halted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal
2008 decision in Andrews. In addition to the 2007 Ameriquest case, in
2004, in Latham v. Residential Loan Centers Of America, Inc.,"' the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the line
133. In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 05-CV-7097, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. April 23, 2007).
134. Id.
135. Latham v. Residential Loan Ctrs. Of Am., Inc.,No. 03-C-7094, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7993, at
8-12 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2004) (criticizing Jefferson v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63
(N.D. Ill. 1995)).
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of cases holding that a class action claim for rescission can be
maintained under TILA Section 1635.136
A variety of other federal district courts across the country have
certified classes for rescission. In Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co.,
the District Court of Massachusetts granted borrowers' motion to
certify a declaratory rescission class under Section 1635 of TILA-
this case was eventually reversed by the Court of Appeal decision in
McKenna.' Nevertheless, the Rodrigues court reasoned that the
class met the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority."' The Rodrigues
court also acknowledged a nascent split in the federal circuits, but
agreed that class resolution is appropriate for declaratory class action
rescission claims under TILA.f
The Rodrigues court responded to defendants' excessive liability
arguments. It wrote:
Defendants' sturm und drang about the catastrophic effects
of a declaration of a right to rescind is particularly
unpersuasive in light of the ... fact that, as they note, few
borrowers are apt to request rescission because of the hassle
and likely higher interest rate involved in re-financing.140
Judge Lindsay's First Circuit 2006 McKenna opinion, which was
reversed in 2007, must also be counted in the recent cases that have
interpreted Section 1635 to permit declaratory rescission claims. In
that case, Judge Lindsay reasoned that declaratory class action
rescission does not pose the same economic threat to the credit
industry that class action damages might.141 Judge Lindsay's rationale
was consistent with TILA's view of rescission as a corrective remedy
that returns the parties to their status quo ante position with respect
to the loan: the consumer tenders the loan principal in exchange for a
return from the lender of interest and fees paid.
VI. OTHER COURTS DENYING RESCISSION CLASS ACTION
CLAIMS
Before the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in McKenna,
136. Latham, No. 03-C-7094, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7993, at *11-12 (N.D. IlIlMay 5, 2004).
137. Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co., 226 F.R.D. 147, 150-53 (D. Mass. 2005).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 153 (citing McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust, Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (D. Mass.
2003) (Young, C.J) (holding class action rescission appropriate, especially when "the plaintiffs seek
only declaratory relief'); Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 435-36 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
140. Rodrigues, 226 F.R.D. at 153.
141. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296, 303-304 (D. Mass. 2006).
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only one court had heretofore addressed the issue of rescission in
class form.142 Since the Seventh Circuit decided Andrews, at least two
other decisions have raised the class action rescission question. A
recent search turned up thousands (roughl 6,000) citations to
Shepardizing the TILA rescission provision. Amparan v. Plaza
Home Mortg., Inc. a California case, indicates that California
consumers are beginning to seek rescission. Briscoe v. Deutsche Bank
Nat. Trust Co, another case from the Seventh Circuit issued an
opinion in which the judge wrote "until such time, if any that
Andrews is appealed and an opposite conclusion reached, I am bound
by the Seventh Circuit's decision." 44
The Seventh Circuit's Andrews decision relied on James v. Home
Construction Co. of Mobile, Inc., a 1980 Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals case that disallowed class action claims for rescission;
however, read in its entirety James is simply not on point.145  James
involved a home improvement loan, not a mortgage or equity
refinance loan; and the issue in James was whether TILA rescission
rights are inheritable (they are), not whether a direct consumer can
sue for declaratory rescission in class form as a shield against
foreclosure.146
In holding that a TILA cause of action survives the death of the
consumer as an inheritable interest, James found that the purpose of
TILA is threefold: (1) to redress individual wrongs (not public
wrongs); (2) to protect individuals in credit markets (not to protect
the public); and (3) to restore the status quo ante (not to penalize the
lender).'47 Only from there did the James court wade into the waters
of class action claims to bar the class action rescission claims of a
borrower's heir. For this reason James is of questionable applicability
142. James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, 621 F.2d 727, 731 (5th Cir. 1980); Gibbons v. Interbank
Funding Group, 208 F.R.D. 278, 285-86 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Jefferson v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., 161
F.R.D. 63, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Morris v.
Wachovia Sec., 223 F.R.D. 284, 297 (E.D. Va. 2004); Murry v. America's Mortg. Banc, Inc., No. 03-C-
5811, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 11751, at *33-34 (N.D. ll. 2005).
143. On file with authors.
144. Briscoe v. Deutsche Bank Nat'] Trust,, No. 08C1279, 2008 WL 4852977, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
07, 2008).
145. Cf Tower v. Moss. Infra note 170.
146. James, 621 F.2d 727, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1980).
147. Id. (This three part test was applied in part as a way to link TILA up to general law:
"Traditionally, the rule has been that actions for penalties do not survive the death of the plaintiff, 110
U.S. 76, 3 S. Ct. 423, 28 L.Ed. 65 (1884).... [T]he Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on three
factors in its analysis of whether a particular statutory provision was penal. It looked at: (a) whether the
purpose of the action was to redress individual wrongs or wrongs to the public; (b) whether the recovery
ran to the individual or the public; (c) whether the recovery was disproportionate to the harm suffered,
(citing Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F. 2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977), which relied heavily on
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892)).
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in a case like Andrews, which involves the rescission claims of the
borrowers themselves. The part of James that is relied on in this
round of mortgage disputes is, therefore, dicta.'48
Jefferson v. Security Pacific Financial Services, a 1995 Illinois
Federal Rules Decision case, relied on James v. Home Constr. Co. of
Mobile, Inc. and was cited by the defendant in McKenna as support
for its anti-declaratory class action rescission argument. 4 9 At issue in
Jefferson was how to define a $90 loan disbursement "fee" under
TILA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals in McKenna cited
Jefferson for the point that "certification of a class seeking a
declaratory judgment regarding a right of rescission for technical
disclosure violations would violate Section 1635(b) of TILA, public
policy and the scant (but currently existing case law on the issue."'
U.S. District Judge Ruben Castillo denied a motion for class
certification in Jefferson because he (incorrectly) thought that TILA
protected creditors' rights, and because he found that "rescission is a
purely personal remedy for technical violations of TILA."
In Judge Castillo's view, the relevant distinction between
whether the charge was a fee or interest was a minor technical matter
that did not give rise to TILA remedies."' This view may be correct
for the Judge's case only because the $90 fee in Jefferson was under
TILA's post-Rodash low-tolerance $100 bar. For that reason, if
Jefferson's value as precedent applies, it holds only in other low-
tolerance cases. Jefferson should not dictate the outcome in above-
tolerance cases like Andrews.
Particularly relevant to Judge Castillo's conclusion in Jefferson
was the language in Section 1635(b) that gives a creditor twenty days
to act on a borrower's request for rescission before the claim can be
filed in court. Judge Castillo said that 1635(b) was a "requirement
[that] cuts strongly in favor of treating rescission as a personal, rather
than a class, remedy. Under Section 1635, individuals must choose to
assert the right to rescind, on an individual basis and within individual
148. James, 621 F.2d at 731 (relied on for comment that "it seems clear, [that section 1635,] gives
the creditor ten [now twenty] days in each case in which to go through the steps of rescission [sic]
before the matter can be brought to court. This is a right which the creditor has with each individual
obligor. Thus the notion of a class action in this sort of context would contradict what would seem to
be the Congressional intent about the nature of this action.") Id. (interpreting this exact 1635(b)
language: "Within ten days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor
any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action
necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the
transaction.").
149. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
150. Jefferson v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Serv., 161 F.R.D. 67 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
151. Id. at 67.
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time frames, before filing suit."1 52 In concluding as he did, Judge
Castillo relied heavily on the James dicta discussed above.
Judge Castillo's opinion, even if correct on the point that a $90
fee is a technical error to which TILA has developed a tolerance, was
weakened by the view of the twenty-day cure period and its function.
Judge Castillo's rationale was that that Section 1635 set into motion
an equitable process, a process that sounds, by Judge Castillo's
description of it, ominously like common law rescission, a process that
gives a court authority to "tailor the rescission steps to meet the needs
of each borrower and creditor.""' It is true that courts have equitable
powers to reach the status quo ante in belated rescission cases. But it
is incorrect to equate common law rescission with TILA rescission, as
Judge Sykes apparently did in her 2008 Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion in Andrews.15 4
But even if the view that equates TILA rescission with common
law rescission in a belated rescission case is correct (and this paper
argues that it is not), then such an equity-based process would return
consumers to a pre-TILA common law regime-a legal regime of
caveat emptor in credit markets, a regime that TILA was meant to
supersede with its explicit grant to consumers of a statutory rescission
right that is not based on common law preconditions such as the
voidability of the contract.
Mortgage lending, while not fully regulated across lenders,
requires the exchange of summary disclosure forms that contain the
material elements of the deal. Thus to the degree that TILA includes
mortgage lending-and it most clearly does-TILA becomes a
corrective to the common law. Indeed TILA is a statute whose
purpose is to create standardized practices in a rights-based manner-
it does this presumably by giving the benefit of certain doubts to
lenders that rely on the Federal Reserve disclosure forms provided in
Regulation Z. Additionally, TILA streamlines the common law by
specifically waiving the precondition of contract voidability (that the
common law required) before rescission could be invoked.
Therefore, it seems a mistake to presume, as Judge Castillo and later
Judge Sykes did (in the Andrews interlocutory appeal), that the
statute is no more than a grant to courts of "equitable authority" that
can be used to "tailor the rescission steps to meet the needs of each
borrower and creditor.""' Judge Castillo correctly described common
152. Jefferson, 161 F.R.D. at 69.
153. Id. at 6 8.
154. Andrews, 545 F. 3d. at 577-78.
155. Jefferson, 161 F.R.D. at 68; Andrews, 545 F. 3d at 577-78.
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law rescission, but TILA rescission, to be sure, is not the same as
common law rescission even in a belated rescission case. To return
the United States economy, to which housing is a central engine, to a
Dickensian caveat emptor approach is a mistake, not just for the
homeowners who face serious financial consequence including
foreclosure, but for investors as well.
Murry, a 2005 U.S. District Court case that arose in the Northern
District of Illinois, is yet another case about how to classify an
overcharge fee under TILA.16  Like McKenna, Murry relied on
Jefferson, which in turn relied on James, to conclude that Section
1635(b) does not permit class action rescission claims."' The Murry
court placed great weight on Section 1640, the TILA section
governing class actions for damages, to make sense of Section 1635.
Murry reasoned that when Section 1640 was amended in 1974 to
expressly include class actions and to impose a cap on damages, the
fact that Congress did not amend Section 1635(b) at that time (1974)
evidenced Congressional intent to treat rescission as a purely
personal remedy."' This is a broad interpretive leap over the 1995
post-Rodash amendments. Nevertheless, this view found its way to
Judge Sykes Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 2008 opinion in
Andrews where it met with sharp criticism from dissenting Judge
Evans-clearly signaling that even on the Seventh Circuit itself there
is a split as to whether TILA allows rescission in class action form."9
Virtually every court to deny rescission class certification in the
last three decades has relied on James-Mayo in 1993,'" Jefferson in
1995,' Gibbons in 2002,162 Morris in 2004,163 Murry in 2005,'
McKenna in 2007,' Andrews in 2008,"' and now Briscoe.67  This
reliance is questionable at best. James is a pre-Rodash amendment
case. It is a case that addresses the lending fringe-predatory home-
improvement loans; it is not a case that addresses the middle-class
156. Murray v. America's Mortg. Banc, Inc., No. 03 C581 1, No. 03 C6816, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11751, at *30 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005).
157. Id.
158. Id.; Act of October 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(2)(B)).
159. Andrews, 545 F. 3d. at 577-78; Id.(Evans, J., dissenting).
160. Mayo v. Key. Fin. Servs., Inc. 424 Mass. 862, 678 N.E.2d 1311 (1997)
161. Jefferson, 161 F.R.D. at 68-69.
162. Gibbons v. Interbank Funding Group, 208 F.R.D. 278, 285-86 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
163. Morris v. Wachovia Secs., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 284, 297 (E.D. Va. 2004).
164. Murray, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 11751, at *30.
165. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 422.
166. Andrews, 545 F.3d. at 577-78.
167. Briscoe v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 08 C 1279, 2008 WL 4852977, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 7, 2008).
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heart of mortgage lending practices. Moreover-and importantly-it
is a case in which a minor error gave rise to rescission. Today James
would not have survived to decision as it likely would have been
blocked under TILA's low-tolerance bar.
Jefferson wrongly resurrected James in 1995, at a time when
Congress was reacting to Rodash.'" In response to Rodash, Congress
placed a temporary moratorium on some class action cases; when the
moratorium expired on Oct 1, 1995, Congress responded by
overruling Rodash via the 1995 post-Rodash amendments to TILA."9
James is a low-tolerance claim that predates the 1995
amendment debates and thus has little or no relevance today. But
even if James is still relevant on the facts like those in McKenna or
Andrews, James fails to address the mechanics of class action
rescission."o Despite the economic hurdles faced by the consumer of
tendering the loan principal, winning the right to proceed with
rescission is an important strategy to forestall foreclosure. In its class
form, rescission is most cost effective remedy for the consumer; it also
seems the most efficient way to proceed in terms of judicial and
systemic efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
On the topic of private legal remedies for current mortgage
problems, policy makers have overlooked TILA in the rush to
legislation. The stated purpose of TILA is "to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms". ' TILA and Regulation Z mandate that
required (material) disclosures be made "clearly and
conspicuously."172 These mandates, coupled with statutory damages
and rescission, is what makes TILA a consumer protection statute in
more than just name.1
168. CONG. REC., supra note 6, at S 14567.
169. 141 CONG. REC. S14566-03 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided a few months after
James, allowing class action rescission as part of a settlement agreement that entitled each class
member to choose between recovering damages by a 15% reduction in the amount owed to Defendant
or rescinding the loan. Of the 143 class members, 103 chose the 15% reduction and only 40 chose to
rescind. This suggests that in practice, a small proportion of those eligible to rescind will in fact do so.).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (2002).
173. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998); accord Begala v. PNC
Bank, Ohio, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TWA is a
remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad, liberal construction in favor of the
consumer."); Fairley v. Turan-Foley Imps., Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The TILA is to be
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Judges have written that TILA was intended by Congress to
balance the scales in mortgage lending so that consumers would have
enough accurate information to engage in what is aspirationally called
"the informed use of credit."l 74  Information is supposed to give
consumers greater bargaining power, but while information can help
protect consumers against unscrupulous lenders, it cannot always
correct lending problems after they have already occurred.
For that reason TILA gives consumers one important
substantive right-the right of rescission. Rescission is a remedy that
is currently available to the consumer. In its class form it is a remedy
that allows the courts to efficiently assist consumers in the
enforcement of their existing TILA rights. Rescission gives the
consumer an existing tool in the arsenal of remedies that can prevent
default and foreclosure. Rescission in its class form allows already
economically distressed consumers to invoke TILA's rescission
remedy with Rule 23 efficiencies. A bar on declaratory class action
claims, on the other hand, simply makes existing TILA remedies fall
out of the reach of consumers who are already stressed to the
financial limit.
Indeed, to have any effect on the field of mortgage lending,
TILA's rescission provision must have a deterrent effect on those
mortgage lenders that would otherwise take a lax approach to their
disclosure obligations under the statute, or worse, on those that would
exploit unsuspecting consumers through misleading disclosures."'
Damages-the imposition of liability-are not enough to make a
consumer whole, particularly if lenders potentially extract more
money from consumers than those same lenders would pay as
damages under TILA over the life of a loan were violations to go by
undetected by the consumer. Rescission is the only remedy that
restores the parties to the status quo ante-at least in terms of the
loan itself. For this reason, the possibility of class action rescission is
an important deterrent to past abuses in mortgage lending.'7
Class action rescission - and perhaps in declaratory form-is
necessary to effectuate the deterrence function of TILA because
enforced strictly against creditors and construed liberally in favor of consumers. . . ."); Thomka v. A.Z.
Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 1980) (TILA achieves its consumer protection purposes "in
part by a system of strict liability in favor of consumers."); Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 280 F.3d 384, 390
(3d Cir. 2002) (plain language of TILA dictates that it should be construed liberally in favor of
consumers); Robert Murken, Can't Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home Equity
Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 457, 490 (2004).
174. See Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., Inc., 654 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981).
175. See Thomka, 619 F.2d at 248.
176. See, e.g., Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 620. (noting that attorneys fees are available to plaintiffs who
prevail under TILA.) .
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statutory damages alone-as distributed to class members-may be
too small to address the harms perpetrated' Class certification
serves an important function in TILA cases, where "the difficult
financial situation of many litigants may inhibit individual
litigation.""" Class actions rovide a mechanism that protects a
litigant's right to court access.
Today's credit markets make the need for clear and accurate
TILA disclosures more pressing than ever. All players in the field
know this; and yet the players also know that it is the consumer-not
the lender-who has the least information. One consumer lawyer
pithily stated that is becoming a matter of common knowledge that
loan products are now so complex that "most lawyers can't get
through [the disclosures]. For the average consumer, it mission
impossible."'" Congress worried about the same problem as early as
1995.
All indicators suggest that the litigation fallout from the
mortgage/housing crisis is in its infancy. In the first quarter of 2008
alone, one reliable analyst found that 170 subprime-related lawsuits
were initiated, with a record seventy-nine of those class action claims
brought by home-loan borrowers against lenders and mortgage
brokers.' Of those, the principal claims of 42% alleged inadequate
disclosure. 82 This represents the largest category of subprime crisis-
related suits filed, and an 85% increase over the previous busiest
quarter.'83
Given the recent proliferation of TILA class action suits,
whether courts can certify classes of borrowers who are seeking
rescission is an increasingly important matter if the government is to
hold back the tide of mass foreclosures. An examination of the split
in the federal courts reveals that those courts that refuse to certify
rescission classes primarily rely on the theory that class certification
will result in catastrophic lender liability; these arguments are
177. Swanson v. Am. Consumers Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1969) (reversed on
other grounds).
178. Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., 204 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2000).
179. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 156 (2005).
180. Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives on Woes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2008.
181. Jeff Nielsen, Subprime Mortgage and Related Litigation - First Quarter 2008 Update:
Reaching New Heights, Navigant Consulting (April 2008); Amir Efrati, Subprime-Crisis Lawsuits
2008: By the Numbers, WALL ST. J. Law Blog, April 24, 2008; Prabha Natarajan, Fannie, Freddie are
Pressured as Homeowners Fall Behind, WALL ST. J. Cl (April 1 2009) (reporting that the speed and the
increased levels at which homeowners are falling behind on mortgage payments is putting renewed
pressure on the financial reserves of Fannie Mae and Freedie Mac).
182. Jeff Nielsen, supra note 181.
183. Jeff Nielsen, supra note 181.
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recycled from the 1995 amendment debates, but they are presented
today in an incomplete and, thus, in an inaccurate form. When
Congress considered the topic of excessive liability it was not as an
absolute. It was only in relation to the problem of low-tolerance
errors in disclosure.
This paper concludes that-prior to this most recent economic
crisis-TILA Section 1635 allowed class action rescission for cases
that fell above the limits of TILA's tolerance level. In light of current
events, it is our view that TILA continues to allow class action
rescission for above-tolerance claims. Indeed, TILA's economic
stabilization language strongly supports a reading of Section 1635 that
keeps the rescission remedy (in class form if that is what it takes)
available to consumers unless and until Congress says otherwise. Not
all consumers will be able to benefit from the economic stimulus
legislation. Nor will all consumers seek the so-called protections of
bankruptcy. Thus TILA rescission-a process whereby the consumer
returns the loan principal in exchange for a return of fees and interest
paid-remains a vital remedy for middle class consumers who are
attempting to weather a fearsome mortgage crisis.
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